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THE STATUS OF POLITICAL FUGITIVES AND
REFUGEES UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
I. EXTRADITION
Although the United States Constitution makes no mention
of extradition, it has been held to be a prerogative of the federal
government.' Absent a treaty, it has been the policy of the United
States to deny extradition.2 A treaty is necessary because United
States criminal statutes do not recognize offenses committed
abroad 3 that do not have an effect within its territory. However,
there have been instances in which the absence of a treaty has
been ignored.' In 1864, a Spanish army officer was surrendered to
Spanish authorities in Cuba without a hearing. At that time, the
United States and Spain did not have an extradition treaty. Sec-
retary of State Seward, in a report of the incident to the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, maintained
that "a nation is never bound to furnish asylum to dangerous
criminals who are offenders against the human race."5
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit stated, in dicta, that "[a]n asylum State might, for
1. Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936). See also United States v. Rausher,
199 U.S. 407 (1886).
2. "The modem view and the one maintained in this country, is that a state is under
no absolute obligation to surrender fugitives accused of crime unless it has contracted to
do so." Greene v. United States, 154 F. 401, 410 (5th Cir. 1907). See also Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). See generally 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11-16 (1943).
3. M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 55 (1956). In
this connection, Thomas Jefferson, replying as Secretary of State to a French request for
the surrender of French nationals accused of plotting against the Republic, stated that
[t]he laws of this country take no notice of crimes committed out of their
jurisdiction. The most atrocious offender, coming within their pale, is received
as an innocent man, and they have authorized no one to seize or deliver him.
The evil of protecting malefactors of every dye is sensibly felt here, as in other
countries, but, until a reformation of the criminal codes of most nations, to
deliver up fugitives from them, would be to become their accomplices. The
former is viewed, therefore, as the lesser evil ....
Kopelman, Extradition and Rendition History-Law-Recommendations, 14 B.U.L. REV.
591, 601 n.31 (1936), quoting T. Jefferson, 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 175 (1832).
4. Although the general rule requires the offense to be covered by the treaty, "con-
gress has the right to provide for the return of a fugitive criminal to a foreign country from
which he has fled; and, waiving any requirement of entire reciprocity from the foreign
country it may, by statute, without treaty, provide for such return." In re Neely, 103 F.
626 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900).
5. 1 J. MOORE, TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 35 (1881).
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reasons of policy, surrender a fugitive political offender ... [I]n
such case we think that the accused would have no immunity
from prosecution in the courts of the demanding State, and we
know of no authority indicating the contrary."' Similarly, in
United States v. Sobell, 7 Judge Kaufman referred to the opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in Ker v. Illinois,8 and stated
that in the absence of an applicable treaty, the federal govern-
ment could use its discretion in extraditing fugitives. Even with
a treaty, "informal expulsion procedures are still available to the
surrendering state both for enumerated and. certainly for non-
enumerated crimes. . . .-
The concept of strict double criminality, that the act must
be an offense under the laws of both the asylum and requesting
States,'0 has been utilized in the past. Some treaties specifically
require double criminality as a prerequisite to extradition in all
cases," while other treaties specify it only for particular offenses.' 2
Wright v. Henke13 provided that when double criminality is re-
quired, the relevant law of the United States jurisdiction in which
the fugitive is found may be applied. In Factor v.
Laubenheimer, 1 the Supreme Court concluded that if an offense
is not specifically listed as one requiring double criminality, all
that is necessary is a general recognition of the criminality of the
offense by the laws of the United States jurisdiction in which the
fugitive is found.
Extradition treaties contain exclusive lists of offenses for
which a person may be extradited. The offenses are not defined;
it is left-to the asylum-State's courts to determine the applicabil-
ity of an enumerated offense to the facts of the case. 5 If the
6. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
918 (1949).
7. 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
8. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
9. 142 F. Supp. at 524.
10. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
11. See, e.g., Treaty of Extradition with the Union of South Africa, Dec. 18, 1947, 2
U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 2243 (1951); Treaty with Switzerland for the Extradition of
Criminals, May 14, 1900, 31 Stat. 1928, T.S. No. 354.
12. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Albania, Mar. 1, 1933, 49 Stat. 3313, T.S. No.
902; Treaty and Exchange of Notes with Austria Concerning Extradition and Commuta-
tion of Death Penalty, Jan. 31, 1930, 46 Stat. 2779, T.S. No. 822.
13. 190 U.S. 40 (1931). The Court also indicated that it is not necessary for double
criminality to be stated in the treaty, as it is a "general principle of international law."
Id. at 58.
14. 290 U.S. 276 (1935).
15. Ex parte Charlton, 185 F. 880 (C.C.D.N.J. 1911), afl'd, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
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accused is sought for multiple offenses, some of which are not
listed in the treaty, the "doctrine of speciality" applies. The doc-
trine provides that the requesting nation cannot punish the fugi-
tive for an offense other than one for which he was surrendered.
The Supreme Court has held this to be a principle of interna-
tional law, apposite even in the absence of an express provision
in the extradition treaty. 6 The doctrine is based upon the premise
that a State has the absolute right to provide asylum; this right
can only be limited by the provisions of a treaty. If an extradited
individual were prosecuted for unrelated offenses, the purpose of
extradition would be subverted. 7
Formal extradition procedures are initiated by the requesting
State's filing of a verified complaint against the fugitive.'" The
extradition magistrate, who may be a federal or state judge or a
federal magistrate, must first decide whether the alleged offense
falls within the ambit of the relevant extradition treaty. If the
magistrate so finds, a warrant for the fugitive's arrest will be
issued. Pursuant to a hearing, the magistrate must determine
whether there would have been sufficient evidence to justify the
individual's apprehension and commitment for trial had the of-
fense been committed within the forum jurisdiction."' The deci-
sion of the magistrate is generally not subject to appellate re-
view. 2 However, a habeas corpus proceeding may be brought to
ascertain whether the magistrate has jurisdiction, whether the
offense was one enumerated by the treaty, and whether there was
evidence warranting the magistrate's findings.2 ' If reasonable
grounds for extradition are found, the magistrate certifies the
evidence and forwards it with a transcript of the hearing to the
Secretary of State, who, upon the request of the petitioning gov-
16. United States v. Rausher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). See also Johnson v. Browne, 205
U.S. 309 (1907).
17. Bassiouni, International Extradition in American Practice and World Public
Order, 36 TENN. L. REv. 1, 15 (1968). In United States v. Mulligan, 74 F.2d 220 (2d Cir.
1934), a relator was extradited from France to the United States, but was released when
the witness died. He was arrested within 30 days for extradition to Canada, on a charge
which had arisen prior to his extradition from France. The court held that France gave
him up solely to be tried for the offense committed in the United States and not for the
offense committed in Canada. Therefore, the United States could not exercise its power
in a matter other than that authorized by France.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970).
19. Id.
20. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922).
21. Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914
(1963); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1931).
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ernment, 2 issues a warrant for surrender. If the fugitive is not
delivered up within two months, he will be released upon applica-
tion "unless sufficient cause is shown . . .why such discharge
ought not to be ordered. 2 3
The Political Offense Exception
An act by an individual may be an offense under an extradi-
tion treaty, yet the asylum State may refuse to extradite because
the act is classified as a political offense. 24 Irrespective of a treaty
mandating extradition it would be improper for one State to sur-
render a fugitive to another State when political passions would
affect the opportunity for a fair and impartial trial.25 The political
offense exception arises in two contexts. The first consists of of-
fenses committed exclusively against the State. This category is
limited to treason, sedition, and espionage. 2 The second encom-
passes offenses against individuals which have political over-
tones. These are referred to as relative political offenses.Y While
it is generally not difficult to determine whether an act is within
the first category, much controversy has arisen over the extent of
political involvement necessary to transform a common offense
into a relative political offense. Courts have been reluctant to
define the term relative political offense precisely. The desire of
governments to allow themselves the greatest freedom in matters
which affect external security and internal peace has caused this
lack of precision.
The traditional position of the United States with regard to
the interpretation of the term relative political offense is founded
upon the English case of In re Castioni. 2 There, the court refused
extradition of one Castioni to Switzerland for the murder of a
Swiss official. Castioni, as a participant in a revolt expressing
dissatisfaction with the administration of a Swiss Canton, shot a
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1970).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1970).
24. The idea of non-extradition of a political offender is relatively recent in origin.
Belgium is credited with being the first country to incorporate this concept into domestic
law. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1971).
25. 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 1019-20 (2d ed. 1951).
26. Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principle of Non-Extradition of Political
Offenders, 9 WAYNE L. REV. 269, 276 (1963).
27. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses; A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1230-31 (1962).
28. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (1890).
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member of the government in the municipal palace. The court
stated that "fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extra-
dition crimes, if those crimes were incidental to and formed part
of political disturbances. '29
Castioni soon found support in the United States in In re
Ezeta3 ° Upon the application for extradition to El Salvador of
Ezeta and others, it was held that "[aipplying by analogy, the
action of the English court in that case [Castion] to the four
cases now before me, under consideration, the conclusion follows
that the crimes charged here, associated as they are with the
actual conflict of armed forces, are of a political character."'"
Subsequently, the extradition of one Lynchbaum, who was ac-
cused of an act in connection with the "overthrow of landlordism"
in Ireland, was denied on the grounds that the act was incidental
to attempts to secure reform in legislation and perhaps independ-
ence.32 The magistrate defined political offenses as "crimes 'inci-
dental to and forming a part of political disturbance,' 'riots for
political purpose;' . . . these definitions are authoritative."33
In 1908, Russia sought the extradition of one Krishean Ru-
dowitz. The federal commissioner approved the extradition re-
quest. However, the decision was reversed by Secretary of State
Knox after a mass protest was held in Chicago. 4 In explaining his
action to the Russian Ambassador, Secretary Knox stated that
the .offenses of killing and burning with which the accused is
charged are clearly political in their nature, and that the rob-
bery committed on the same occasion was a natural incident to
executing the resolutions of the revolutionary group and cannot
be treated as a separate offense. .... 15
29. Id. at 166.
30. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
31. Id. at 999.
32. 1 HYDE, supra note 25, at 574, citing Opinion of Commissioner Moores, Proceed-
ings in Case of James Lynchbaum.
33. Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 Ahi. J. INT'L
L. 247, 267 (1933).
34. Id. See text accompanying note 63 infra.
35. 4 HACKWORTH, supra note 2, at 49. Secretary Knox went on to state that:
[h]owever much the Government of the United States may deplore or con-
demn acts of violence done in the commission of acts having political purpose
. if those acts were in fact done in the execution of such a purpose, there
is no right to issue a warrant of extradition therefore.
"[A] person acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of vio-
lence of a political character, with a political object, and as part of the political
[Vol. 11:2
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Currently, the United States has extradition treaties in force
with some eighty States, and is a signatory of a multilateral con-
vention concluded in Montevideo in 1933.11 All provide for the
political offense exception, but the exact wording varies. Most
extradition treaties may be classified into one of several types
according to the phrasing of the political offense exception
clause." The simplest form of the exception is the clause which
merely states that the treaty is inapplicable to political offenses.
Some treaties of this type also contain a doctrine of speciality
clause. 9 Treaties in this class fail to indicate which State is to
raise the exception and which is to determine whether the act
movement and uprising in which he is taking part" is a political offender and
so entitled to an asylum in this country ...
Id. at 50.
36. Extradition Convention with Other American Republics, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3111, T.S. No. 882. The current parties to the treaty are Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, El
Salvador, and the United States. The convention does not abrogate any bilateral treaty
in force, but provides that upon lapse of a bilateral treaty it will take effect. As the United
States has outstanding bilateral extradition treaties with all signatories of the convention,
it is wholly inoperative as to the United States.
37. See Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense Excep-
tion in Extradition-A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DEPAuL
L. REv. 217, 260-262 (1969).
The United States extradition treaty with Brazil contains what is considered by many
to be a carefully worded political offense exception. Bassiouni, supra note 17, at 18. The
Treaty of Extradition with the United States of Brazil, art. V, Jan. 13, 1961, 15 U.S.T.
2093, T.I.A.S. No. 5691, provides that:
[t]he allegation by the person sought of political purpose or motive for the
request for his extradition will not preclude that person's surrender if the crime
or offense for which his extradition is requested is primarily an infraction of the
ordinary penal law. In such case the delivery of the person being extradited will
be dependent on an understanding on the part of the requesting State that the
political purpose or motive will not contribute toward making the penalty more
severe.
38. Illustrative of such clauses is the wording, "[the treaty] shall not apply to any
crime or offense of a political character. . . ." See, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Albania,
art. 3, Mar. 1, 1933, 49 Stat. 3313, T.S. No. 902; Treaty with Ecuador Relative to Extradi-
tion, art. 3, June 28, 1872, 18 Stat. (3) 1756, T.S. No. 79; Convention for the Mutual
Delivery of Criminals and Fugitives from Justice with Austria, art. 3, July 3, 1856, 11 Stat.
691, T.S. No. 9.
39. See text accompanying note 16 supra. "A person who has been surrendered...
shall consequently in no case be prosecuted. . . on account of a political crime or offense
committed by him previously to his extradition or on account of an act connected with
such a political crime or offense." See, e.g., Supplementary Convention to the Extradition
Convention of October 26, 1901 and of June 20, 1935 with Belgium, art. 4, Nov. 14, 1963,
15 U.S.T. 2252, T.I.A.S. No. 5715; Extradition Treaty with Poland, art. 3, Nov. 22, 1927,
46 Stat. 2282, T.S. No. 789; Extradition Treaty with Turkey, art. 3, Aug. 6, 1923, 49 Stat.
2692, T.S. No. 872.
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comes within the exception. Another form of the exception pro-
vides that a person shall not be surrendered if he can prove that
he will be punished for an offense of a political character.'" This
clause implies that the fugitive has the responsibility to raise the
political exception defense in the asylum State's courts. Some
treaties state that the courts of the asylum State shall determine
whether or not the offense is of a political nature.4'
The Department of State favors a restrictive reading of the
political offense exception because, were a liberal view to be ac-
cepted, "[n]ot only would such interpretation and application of
the treaties seriously inhibit the ability of the United States to
fulfill what this Department, and undoubtedly the other parties
to the treaties, construe as the obligation under the treaties, but
it can fairly be assumed that such restrictive interpretation and
application of the treaty will redound to our detriment when we
attempted to invoke our rights under such treaties."42
Many of the older treaties contain the attentat clause, which
has its basis in Belgian law.43 That law provided that "[t]here
shall not be considered as a political crime or as an act connected
with such a crime an attack upon the person of the head of a
foreign government or of members of his family, when the attack
takes the form of either murder, assassination, or poisoning."44
This provision made its first appearance in United States treaties
in the 1882 extradition treaty with Belgium.45 With one excep-
tion,4" treaties entered into by the United States from 1909
through the early 1930s contained this clause." Although much
40. See, e.g., Treaty for Extradition of Fugitives from Justice with Bolivia, art. 6,
Apr. 21, 1900, 32 Stat. 1857, T.S. No. 339; Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, art. 6,
Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849; Treaty of Extradition with the Union of South
Africa, art. 6, Dec. 18, 1947, 2 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 2243.
41. See, e.g., Supplementary Extradition Treaty with Austria, art. 3, May 19, 1934,
49 Stat. 2710, T.S. No. 873.
42. Letter from Acting Legal Advisor Meeker to Assistant Attorney General Miller,
June 6, 1961, Department of State MS. File No. 211.3115 Perez Jiminez Marcos, quoted
in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 766 (1968).
43. Annales Parlementaires, Chambre des Reprdsentans, Dec. 18, 1855. Law of
March 22, 1856.
44. For an English translation of this provision, see Draft Convention on Extradition,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 363 (Supp. 1935).
45. Convention voithiBelgium for the Extradition of Criminals, art. 4, para. 2, July
13, 1882, 22 Stat. 972, .S No. 30.
46. The exception was the Extradition Treaty with Germany, July 12, 1930, 47 Stat.
1862, T.S. No. 836.
47. Deere, supra note 33, at 253.
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of United States law has come from principles of common law, it
should be noted that Britain does not utilize the attentat clause
as it conflicts with British law providing that attacks against the
Sovereign are treason and therefore political."
The attentat exception to the political offense exception has
been the target of much criticism. It has been suggested that it
is too narrow, as there is no valid reason for confining the excep-
tion to attempts to kill a head of State or his family. 9 It has also
been criticized for being too broad, since it removes from the
exception all assassination attempts against a head of State, even
those based upon a valid political objective. It has been said that
"the Belgian clause goes too far, since exceptional cases of murder
of heads of State from political motives or for political pur-
poses might occur which do not deserve extradition. ' '5' More re-
cent treaties no longer have this provision.
Non-inquiry
While the courts of the United States are apparently willing
to go to great lengths to find an offense to be within the ambit of
the political offense exception, the courts do not readily examine
the motives of the requesting State in seeking extradition, even
if it is claimed that the fugitive is sought on purely political
grounds.2 The courts have assumed a modest view of their com-
petence in this area, and have preferred to let the executive
branch decide these questions. 3
This position is illustrated by the case of one Lincoln, 4 who
was to be extradited to England to face trial on forgery charges.
48. Id.
49. Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition
and Asylum, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 371, 383 (1953), citing F. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (6th ed. 1915). This criticism has itself been called into question
for refusing to recognize that the line must be drawn somewhere, and that extending it
would effectively destroy the concept of political offense. Id. at 383-84.
50. The Convention of May 14, 1897 between the United States and Brazil attempted
to overcome the restrictiveness of the attentat clause and included the president, vice
president, governors, and lieutenant-governors of the states within the exception. Treaty
and Protocol with Brazil for the Extradition of Criminals, May 14, 1897, 33 Stat. 2091,
T.S. No. 423.
51. Oppenheim, cited in Clark, Coudert & Mack, The Nature and Definition of
Political Offense in International Extradition, AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 95, 158 (1909).
52. Jacob, International Extradition: Implications of the Eisler Case, 59 YALE L.J.
622, 633 (1950). But see text accompanying notes 61-66 infra.
53. Id.
54. In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
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Lincoln claimed that he was being sought solely on political
grounds because extradition had not been requested until after he
had published politically inflammatory writings against the Eng-
lish government. The court refused to dispose of the question.
[I]t is not a part of the court proceedings ... nor of the hearing
upon the charge of crime to exercise discretion as to whether the
criminal charge is a cloak for political action, nor whether the
request is made in good faith. . . . The government of the
United States, through the Secretary of State should determine
whether the foreign government is in fact able to exercise its
civil powers, and whether diplomatic and treaty relations are
being carried out and respected in such a way that it is safe to
surrender an alleged criminal under a treaty. 5
This "rule of non-inquiry" was applied in 1934 in the case of
In re Normano 6 Normano was a Jewish professor residing in the
United States after arriving from Germany. Germany sought his
extradition, which he opposed on the ground that the anti-
Semetic policy of the government in power would prevent his
receiving a fair trial. Although in the interim he was released
because he had been held for more than two months,5 the court
stated in dicta that "[w]hatever may be the situation in Ger-
many, the extradition treaty between that government and the
United States is still in full force, and it is the duty of the court
to uphold and respect it just as it is bound to uphold the laws and
Constitution of the United States."5 Normano must be con-
trasted with Gallina v. Fraser,59 in which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressed the opinion that
"[w]e can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradi-
tion, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipath-
etic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require reexamina-
tion of the principle set out above."60
In addition to the courts, the executive branch has authority
to inquire into extradition. By statute, the Secretary of State may
55. Id. at 74.
56. 7 F. Supp. 329 (D. Mass. 1934).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1970) provides that whenever any person is not delivered up
and conveyed out of the United States within two calendar months after commitment to
jail, he may be discharged from custody upon application.
58. 7 F. Supp. at 330-31.
59. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).




order a fugitive committed and delivered "to be tried for the
offense of which charged.""1 This duty was originally held to be
ministerial in nature.2 It was soon established, however, that the
executive department has discretion in the matter.63 The
Department of State may refuse to permit extradition even
though the examining commissioner has found grounds to exist.64
Thus, both the judicial and the executive branches must be in
agreement as to the propriety of the request.
This power of review has been subject to a self-imposed re-
straint. The Secretary has continuously refused, as has the judici-
ary, to consider allegations that the fugitive would not receive a
fair trial in the requesting State. Thus, after the court in
Normano declined to rule on possible prejudice in the requesting
State, the Legal Advisor's Office of the Department of State is-
sued an opinion stating that the failure to receive a fair trial
would not be justification for an executive refusal of surrender.6 5
Some treaties, however, provide that a fugitive shall not be sur-
rendered "if he proves that the requisition for his surrender has
in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense
of a political character."66
Recent definitions of the political offense
The United States has continued its liberal policy of denying
extradition for political offenses. Perhaps the most vivid example
of this liberality is Artukovic v. Boyle."7 Ardrija Artukovic was an
official in the Croatian Government. Yugoslavia sought his return
on the grounds that, as Minister of the Interior in the government
of Ante Pavelic, he issued orders for the murder of over 1200
persons during a power struggle for control of Croatia. The dis-
trict court held that the offenses were political 6 and therefore
non-extraditable under the applicable treaty. 9 "The plain read-
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1970).
62. In re Sheazle, 21 F. Cas. 1214 (No. 12,734) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).
63. In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 281 (No. 13,562) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875).
64. See, e.g., Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1971).
65. 4 HACKWORTH, supra note 2, at 202 & 215-16. But see Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d
1005 (5th Cir. 1971).
66. Extradition Treaty with Great Britain, Dec. 22, 1931, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849.
67. 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247
F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), rehearing sub nom.
United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (surrender denied).
68. 140 F. Supp. at 247.
69. Id. The District Court was referring to the Treaty with Servia for the Mutual
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ing of the indictment here makes it immediately apparent that
the offenses for which the surrender of the petitioner is sought,
were offenses of a political character."7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court and discussed the contention that Artu-
kovic's acts were of the character of war crimes, and that such
crimes are subject to extradition. The court stated:
We now consider the question whether because the of-
fenses are also called "war crimes" they have lost their char-
acter as "political offenses" within the meaning of the treaty.
Appellant argues that "war crimes" are crimes for which extra-
dition is to be granted within the meaning of international acts
to which the United States is a party. It is argued by recent
legal writers that the "barbarity and atrocity of the crimes
[crimes against the law of war and crimes against humanity]
committed weigh so heavily upon the common crime element
that the political act has practically ceased to exist and, there-
fore, that the extradition of the offender is the only justifiable
course of action."
Appellant in essence argues that by virtue of resolutions
taken in 1946 and 1947 by the United Nations General Assembly
as to the surrender of alleged war criminals, it is incumbent on
this Court to hold that Artukovic is charged with an offense
which is extraditable.
We have examined the various United Nations Resolutions
and their background and have concluded that they have not
sufficient force of law to modify long standing judicial interpre-
tations of similar treaty provisions. Perhaps changes should be
made as to such treaties."
The court cited Castioni with approval, but went too far in find-
ing a relationship between this offense and a political view. It
may well be true that the connection between the offense and the
political act has become so tenuous as to be in truth nonexistent.
The court, in dicta, also appeared to accept Artukovic's con-
tention that there was immunity from prosecution on the basis
of the act of state doctrine. In this regard, the court stated that
"[tihe District Court properly took judicial notice of the fact
that Ante Pavelic was the Premier of Croatia during World War
II. . . .We conclude that the finding. . . that the offenses...
Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Oct. 25, 1901, 32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406.
70. 140 F. Supp. at 247.
71. 247 F.2d at 204-05.
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were offenses of a political character was correct. '7 2 Implicit in
this statement is at least tacit approval of an application of the
act of state doctrine. But the doctrine does not apply to war
crimes. In a similar situation, the act of state doctrine was re-
jected by the Nuremburg court and the war crimes tribunals. 3
Operation of the act of state doctrine to possible political
offenses was clarified in Jimenez v. Aristeguieta.4 Venezuela
sought the extradition of Jimenez for murder and financial offen-
ses while he was chief executive of that country. He contended
that, as the acts charged were done in exercise of his powers as
chief of State, he was entitled to be discharged from custody. 5
The court held that an individual must act in his official capacity
for the doctrine to be applied." The offenses for which Jimenez
was sought did not fit into this category. Furthermore, the court
indicated that even if the act of state doctrine were applicable to
the facts, its actual invocation should be left to the executive
department.77
The Artukovic court indicated that "the Castioni case was
recently reconsidered by the English courts . . . , but that
"American cases have more or less adopted language in
Castioni. "'I This has been seen by some to indicate a failure of
the United States courts to accept a more liberal view of the
political offense exception."0 But this is not accurate.
The case in which Castioni was reconsidered was Regina v.
Governor of Brixton Prison ex rel Kolczynski,5' in which seven
members of a crew of a Polish fishing vessel overpowered the
other members of the crew in order to seek political asylum in
72. Id. at 204.
73. Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition of
Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927, 943 (1964). In this regard the author states
"[rieliance upon inherited principles in order to characterize crimes against humanity
as political, merely because they are committed by agents of the State, amounts to
asserting an extravagant claim for which there is no support in law or in fact, and certainly
affords no comfort to those who have been the victims of aggression upon all law and
humanity." Id. at 943-44 (footnote omitted).
74. 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962).
75. Id. at 557-58.
76. Id. at 558.
77. Id.
78. 247 F.2d at 203.
79. Id.
80. Green, Political Offenses, War Crimes and Extradition, 11 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q.
329, 333 (1962).
81. [1955] 1 Q.B. 540.
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England. The court held the mutiny to be a political offense, and
not subject to extradition.
[T]he words "offense of a political character" must always be
considered according to the circumstances existing at the time
when they have to be considered. . . .In this case the members
of the crew ...were under political supervision and they re-
volted by the only means open to them. They committed an
offence of a political character, and if they were surrendered
there could be no doubt that, while they would be tried for the
particular offence mentioned, they would be punished as for a
political crime.82
But the facts of Kolczynski are not relevant to the facts in
Artukovic. Under the Castioni doctrine, Kolczynski would have
been decided differently since there was no political uprising in
the traditional sense. In Artukovic, such a set of circumstances
was found to exist. Therefore, the Artukovic court properly did
not broaden an accepted doctrine, contrary to Professor Green's
opinion. The cases and facts were clearly distinguishable. Given
the proclivity of commentators to cite dicta as hallowed rules of
law, it may be a blessing in disguise that the court did not pro-
vide additional enlightenment of an area not relevant to the case
at bar.
United States courts have not ignored Kolczynski totally,
however. In In re Gonzalez,"3 the Dominican Republic sought the
extradition of Clodeveo Ortiz Gonzalez, who participated in the
torture and killing of two prisoners while acting in "a military or
quasi-military capacity under the regime of Generalissimo Rafael
Trujillo. ' ' 84 The court held that, under the traditional Castioni
test, Gonzalez's actions were not incidental to a political disturb-
ance." The court then went on to indicate that in the proper
circumstances the traditional view could be modified along the
lines of Kolczynski86 The Kolczynski doctrine, therefore, would
82. Id. at 549. Evidence was submitted that tape recordings were being made of the
fugitives' conversations while at sea, and that the recordings were to be used in preparing
a case against them based on their political beliefs. Id. at 550.
83. 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
84. Id. at 719 (footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 721.
86. "Kolczynski, as well as the history of the political offense exception in Anglo-
American law, arguably indicate that the political offense exception legitimately can be
applied with greater liberality where the demanding state is a totalitarian regime seeking
the extradition of one who has opposed that regime in the cause of freedom." Id. at 721
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seem not to be disfavored by the courts of the United States, but
it remains dormant. While it is sometimes felt that the use of the
political offense exception has been so limited in scope as to be-
come almost illusory,8 7 the principle is still applied in United
States courts.
H. DEPORTATION AND EXTRADITION
The immigration laws of the United Statesm have been used
as an alternative to extradition. As Hackworth explains:
The immigration laws of the United States provide for the
exclusion or deportation of aliens who have been convicted of or
who admit the commission of certain classes of crimes in foreign
countries. These laws are separate and distinct from the laws
and treaties relating to extradition. They are not enacted for the
benefit of foreign governments or for the purpose of bringing
fugitives to justice; rather, they are for the protection of the
United States. However, requests are sometimes made by gov-
ernments for the deportation by other governments of fugitives
from justice, and occasionally steps are taken-especially in the
absence of an extradition treaty-to deport such persons. 9
Exclusion-the denial of entry into the United States-has
been requested in many instances when there was no extradition
treaty, when a treaty did not cover the alleged offense, and in
other circumstances." Deportation is not available if the fugitive
entered the United States legally and has not violated the immi-
gration laws, is a national of the United States, or is not actually
implicated in the manner alleged by the requesting State.91
The reasons for using deportation and exclusion as alterna-
tives to extradition are pragmatic ones. Much time is involved in
an extradition proceeding. Deportation is a practical method of
disposing of the matter.2 In the opinion of one authority,93 this
n.9. This was not a case in which the acts in question were blows struck against a repres-
sive totalitarian regime in the cause of freedom.
87. Garcia-Mora, supra note 49, at 371.
88. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, ch. 6, 79 Stat. 918.
89. 4 HACKWORTH, supra note 2, at 30.
90. See Evans, Acquisition of Custody Over the International Fugitive Of-
fender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 40 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L. 77, 83-4 (1964).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 94 n.4, citing Department of State MS. File No. 211.44Sm 6 (Jamaica,
93. Id. at 103.
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situation is partly the fault of the cumbersome extradition pro-
cess, and partly the fault of officials whose judgments are blurred
by the exigencies of the situation. Additionally, the fugitive who
is being deported rather than extradited carries the burden of
claiming misuse of the deportation statutes, and must challenge
the good faith of three executive agencies: the Immigration Serv-
ice, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State. But
both the asylum and requesting States have a responsibility to
insure that their concern with the ends of their procedures does
not overshadow their obligation to be just in the means they
employ. 4
Occasionally there are clashes between extradition and im-
migration proceedings. Venezuelan Ex-President Jimenez at-
tempted to use section 243(h)95 as a bar to extradition. 6 He urged
that a duty of deportation under that section should take prece-
dence over an extradition order approved by the Secretary of
State. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected this claim and
commented:
there is no inherent inconsistency between, on the one hand, our
Treaty of Extradition with Venezuela and the statutory provi-
sions of deportation, including withholding of deportation on
the basis of impending physical persecution. Any inconsistency
which might result would arise only from divergent applications
of these provisions by different government officials. Statutes
should be interpreted and applied, however, so as to render
them harmonious and to give maximum effpct to the provisions
of each.
A decision by the Secretary of State granting extradition
will terminate any deportation proceedings in whatever posture
they might be in at the time. 7
Ill. IMMIGRATION
When an alien comes to the United States seeking refuge
from repression, the fact that he has not committed an extradita-
ble offense does not assure him asylum. The Supreme Court, in
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,9" held that "[i]t is an accepted
94. Id. at 104.
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
96. In re Perez-Jimenez, 10 I. & N. Dec. 309 (1963).
97. Id.
98. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its do-
minions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such
conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."99 In the United States,
this power is regulated by treaty or acts of Congress and enforced
by the executive.
Prior to 1952, little relief was given to the political refugee. 0
In 1875, Congress first established the current "political" excep-
tion to the rule that those convicted of enumerated offenses would
not be allowed to immigrate to the United States.10' In 1917,
Congress exempted those who left their homelands because of
religious persecution from taking a required literacy test for
entry. 0 2
Early deportation statutes did not provide any special relief
for the political refugee. However, the executive branch was al-
lowed discretion to either permit the alien to leave voluntarily or
to temporarily stay deportation. The judiciary was loathe to
tamper with this discretion. 13
The Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952104 grants a
99. Id. at 659. The Supreme Court has also held that suspension of deportation is a
matter of grace "rather than a right." Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956).
100. For a more detailed history, see Evans, The Political Refugee in United States
Immigration Law and Practice, 3 INT'L LAW. 204 (1969).
101. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
102. Act of Feb. 3, 1917, ch. 28, § 3, 39 Stat. 874.
103. Judge Hand remarked, with regard to the deportation of one Giletti, that:
[h]is offenses are apparently political, for which he could not be extradited.
True, this does not prevent us from ridding ourselves of his presence for crimes
committed here, but it has been our traditional policy. . . not to assist in the
prosecution of political offenses, and it would seem to be a corollary that, when
the choice is open, we should not make it an incident of the execution of our
own laws that the offender should be subjected to the discipline of another
country for crimes of that character. The occasion would therefore seem to be
one in which the utmost latitude might properly be given him, consonant with
law to escape these consequences.
United States ex rel. Giletti v. Commissioner of Immigration, 35 F.2d 687, 689 (2d Cir.
1929). See also United States ex rel. Fortmueller v. Commissioner of Immigration, 14 F.
Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). But see United States ex rel. Weinberg v. Schlotfeldt, 26 F.
Supp. 283 (N.D. Ill. 1938), which was held to be "clearly erroneous" in Soewapadji v.
Wixon, 157 F. 289, 290 (9th Cir. 1946) cert. denied, 329 U.S.792 (1946).
104. 66 Stat. 162. In addition, the United States has bound itself to the substantive
parts of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150, through its adoption of the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. By approving the Protocol, the United
States has become bound to Article 33 of the Convention, which provides:
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very low priority to those seeking entry into the United States due
to fear of persecution." 5 The provisions of the law limit such
refugees to persons who have fled from any Communist or
Communist-dominated country or area, or from any country
within the Middle East, for fear of persecution on account of race,
1. No contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would
be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final
judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the com-
munity of that country.
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees extended protection only to those
persons who became refugees "as a result of events occuring before January, 1951." Id. at
art. 1, para. A(2). This limiting clause was extended by the Protocol, which provided that
the substantive provisions of the Convention were to be applied as if the restrictive date
clause were omitted.
There is little case law on the effects of the Protocol. In 1971, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit upheld a State Department decision to refuse extradition to Panama
when the accused would be subject to punishment for his political opinions. Nicosia v.
Wall, 442 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1971). Agreements between the United States and Panama
did not have a political offense exception but, using the Protocol as a basis, the State
Department refused extradition. The court thus allowed the State Department to enforce
the Protocol against Panama, a non-signatory State.
Other decisions on both the administrative and the judicial levels have unanimously
affirmed the proposition that the Protocol has not modified the existing laws of the United
States. Chim Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd, 505 F.2d 1170 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 911 (1975); Kan Kam Lin v. Rinaldi, 361 F. Supp. 177
(D.N.J. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 493 F.2d 1229 (3d Cir. 1974); In re Dunar, Interim Dec.
No. 2192 (I. & N., Apr. 17, 1973). Indeed, the courts have indicated that the reason for
United States accession to the Protocol was not to benefit refugees within the United
States, but rather was a method of indicating approval of its contents. In Chim Ming v.
Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court cited the approval message of Presi-
dent Johnson to the Senate as follows:
It is decidedly in the interest of the United States to promote this United
Nations effort to broaden the extention of asylum and status for those fleeing
persecution. Given the American heritage of concern for the homeless and perse-
cuted, and our traditional role of leadership in promoting assistance for refugees,
accession by the United States would lend conspicuous support to the effort of
the United Nations toward attaining the Protocol's objectives everywhere.
Id. at 677-78, citing S. Exec. K, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at III.
105. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)-(6) (1970). Political refugees are of class seven priority,
preceeded by (in order): unmarried children of United States citizens, spouses and chil-
dren of a lawfully admitted alien, members of the professions and those with "exceptional
ability in the sciences or the arts" which will substantially benefit the United States,
married children of United States citizens, brothers and sisters of United States citizens,
and laborers possessing skills of which there is a shortage in the United States.
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religion, or political opinion, and are unable or unwilling to return
to such country.'"6
The political refugee is also subject to the exclusion provision
of the statute,10 which provides that all aliens "convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political
offense). . . [or] who have been convicted of two or more offen-
ses (other than purely political offenses) shall be excluded from
admission to the United States."'0 8 Thus, the political offense
exception appears in the immigration laws. The political offense
exception in the statute, however, is not interpreted restrictively
as is the case in extradition treaties. The Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service [hereinafter referred to as Immigration Serv-
ice], in a 1950 decision,' 9 held that the test to be applied is the
Castioni test of offenses incidental to or part of a political disturb-
ance. Thus, as used in the statute, the term embraces not only a
purely political offense but also the relative political offense as
well.
The political refugee may enter as a quota immigrant,"" a
special immigrant from a country of the Western Hemisphere,"'
or a non-quota immigrant."2 The alien may enter conditionally,
either on the basis of his refugee status 3 or at the discretion of
the Attorney General." 4 A refugee is an excludable alien subject
to deportation, but the refugee's status may be adjusted to that
of a permanent resident at the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral." 5 If the refugee has previously entered the United States and
is ordered deported, deportation may be withheld if, in the opin-
ion of the Attorney General, the person would be subject to perse-
cution in the receiving country."'
The two important elements of refugee classification are the
circumstances surrounding the applicant's departure from his
homeland and the circumstances militating against his return.17
106. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970).
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1970).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)-(10) (1970).
109. In re K, 4 I. & N. Dec. 108 (1950).
110. 8 U.S.C. H9 1115, 1153 (1970).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (1970).
112. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15), 1184 (1970).
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1970).
114. 8 U.C.S. § 1182(d)(5) (1970).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1970).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
117. See Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws, A Case
Note, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 921, 923-24 (1968).
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Although the refugee must establish that inability and unwilling-
ness to return are predicated upon fear of persecution, the refugee
need not prove that he, in fact, will be subject to persecution." 8
Imprisonment for violating a civil law does not, in itself, indicate
persecution.'
An applicant seeking refugee status must, therefore, be genu-
inely fleeing to escape persecution.' ° The Immigration Service
has denied refugee status to an alien who left her homeland to
visit her daughter,"' and to another person who left to obtain
further education. 2 2 Yet, the Immigration Service has defined the
term "fled" to encompass departing from a homeland prior to the
circumstance which caused the applicants to become refugees. In
In re Zedkova,'2 3 Zedkova left her native Czechoslovakia prior to
the Russian intervention of August, 1968. Based upon her claim
that she would be subject to persecution upon return, the Immi-
gration Service granted her refugee status. The Regional Com-
missioner decided that "it would be extremely narrow and in-
equitable to view those nationals who physically fled. . . because
of political opinion as refugees and to withhold such status from
those who remain out of the country for the very same rea-
son. . . . It is immaterial whether the circumstance . . . oc-
curred before or after departure from the country or area.' '2 4
The political refugee and deportation
An alien who attempts to delay deportation on the grounds
of persecution "has the burden of satisfying the special inquiry
officer that he would be subpect [sic] to persecution on account
of race, religion, or political opinion as claimed.' '2 On appeal,
the alien must prove that the finding was so arbitrary or capri-
cious as to constitute a denial of due process. 2'
118. In re Shirinian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 392 (1967).
119. In re Moy, 12 I. & N. Dec. 117 (1967).
120. In re Tom, 11 I. & N. Dec. 798 (1966).
121. In re Lalian, 12 I. & N. Dec. 124 (1967).
122. In re Frisch, 12 I. & N. Dec. 40 (1967).
123. In re Zedkova, 13 I. & N. Dec. 626 (1970).
124. Id. at 628.
125. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1976).
126. Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950
(1961). See generally United States ex rel. Kordic v. Esperdy, 276 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), affd, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 935 (1968). Judge Frank,
in United States ex rel. Fong Foo v. Shaughnessy, 234 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1954), questioned
the constitutionality of allowing the Attorney General discretion in such proceedings.
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Prior to 1965, the law required that the refugee must be in
fear of physical persecution. 12 In 1958, the Immigration Service
defined physical persecution, which is usually based upon race,
religion, or political opinions, as including incarceration, subjec-
tion to corporal punishment, torture, or death. 2 ' Applying that
standard, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit refused to withhold deportation of a Yugoslav who peti-
tioned that he would be denied employment upon his return be-
cause of his Church membership. 2 ' The same year, however, the
Third Circuit allowed a stay of deportation .after it had been
denied by the Attorney General."' Here, too, a Yugoslav peti-
tioner contended that he would be unable to earn a livelihood
because of his practice of Roman Catholicism. The court reasoned
that the Attorney General had defined the term persecution in-
correctly, placing too much emphasis on the means rather than
the ends of persecution. The court stated that
[t]he statute does not concern itself with the manner in
which physical persecution is inflicted, so long as that is the net
effect of the forces or the circumstances that the Yugoslavian
government will impose .... However, there is no basis for
thinking that "physical persecution" requires or even connotes
the use of intensive physical force applied to the body with all
the dramatics of the rack and wheel. The denial of an opportun-
ity to earn a livelihood in a country such as the one involved here
is the equivalent of a sentence to death by means of slow starva-
tion and none the less final because it is gradual. The result of
both is the same, and it is one Congress, motivated by the hu-
manitarian instincts that have always characterized our con-
duct and that of our civilization, certainly hoped to avoid when
subsection 243(h) was enacted."'
In 1965, "physical persecution" in section 243(h) was modified to
read "persecution.' 3 2 The Board of Immigration Appeals, in In
re Janus and Janek,33 responded to criticism levelled at the diffi-
culty of success in a section 243(h) proceeding by explaining that
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1964), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
128. Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 844
(1962), citing In re Kale, Imm. Adm. Dec. A9 555 532 (1958).
129. 299 F.2d at 244.
130. Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1961).
131. Id. at 746. On reargument the court split equally on the decision but all eight
members agreed that economic sanctions may amount to physical persecution. Id. at 753.
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (Supp. I, 1965), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1964).
133. 12 I. & N. Dec. 866 (1968).
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flight motivated by fear of persecution for political considerations
is sufficient for the purposes of a section 243(h) stay of deporta-
tion.'
In Kovac v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,3 ' the
modification of the statute was held to have eliminated a require-
ment that all means of obtaining a livelihood must be removed
before a claimant could fall within the ambit of the statute. The
court indicated approval for the "enlightened interpretation of
the statute"'3 6 in Janus. It reasoned that deletion of the word
"physical" from section 243(h) shifted the emphasis from the act
of oppression to the results, and that this removed any require-
ment for the denial of all employment opportunities as grounds
for a stay. In the instant case, the petitioner showed that he had
suffered economic deprivation by the secret police in their efforts
to induce him to spy on Hungarian refugees. The Board denied
his stay because he was still employed when he left for the United
States."'
In Berto v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,3 ' the
134. Id. at 876-77.
Section 243(h) cases must be decided individually, on all of their facts; the
performance of a particular act or the following of a specified course of conduct
are no more than guidelines for arriving at a result on the basis of an entire
record. We are not convinced that every travel restriction imposed by an Iron
Curtain country and punished, in the breach, by imprisonment, is political
persecution; or that every person who leaves such a country and subjects himself
to the penalties provided under those laws by remaining outside of his country
for longer than permitted is a bona fide refugee, or a person who will be subject
to persecution on his return because of his political opinion. A person whose
departure from an Iron Curtain country is devoid of political motivation, or
whose decision not to return is unrelated to the politics of that country (e.g.,
the person who finds better economic opportunity here, or enters into a marital
relationship with a resident alien or United States citizen) is not entitled to a
section 243(h) stay solely on the basis that he may face criminal prosecution for
overstay. Nor is a person who has not expressed opposition to the political
regime before departure automatically excluded from relief, if he can show that
his departure was politically motivated and that any consequences he faces on
return are political in nature. Each case, as we have said before, must be consid-
ered on all of its facts, each factor given its proper weight. We are aware of the
inherent nature and intended function of the 243(h) stay provisions, and have
shaped our decisions accordingly.
Id.
135. 407 F.2d 102 (9th Cir. 1969).
136. Id. at 106.
137. Id. The court held that the Board was "arbitrary and capricious" in its finding
that petitioner's work on board a ship was inconsistent with his claim of economic persecu-
tion.
138. 432 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1970).
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Sixth Circuit relied upon Janus. Petitioner Berto entered the
United States on a visitor's visa. Upon expiration of his visa and
initiation of deportation proceedings, he requested asylum by
means of a stay in the expulsion action. He produced uncontro-
verted evidence that he would be subject to persecution upon his
return to Hungary. The court found that the factors disclaimed
by the Board in Janus as grounds for deportation were supportive
grounds for deportation in the instant case."3 9 Thus, it is safe to
assume that the Immigration Service, with prodding from the
courts, will be more liberal in applying the "enlightened interpre-
tation" of the statute that the recent political refugee cases have
engendered.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States has traditionally been liberal in protect-
ing the political fugitive. The courts attempt to categorize an
offense as within the political offense exception to extradition
treaties and the immigration laws in order to provide beneficial
treatment for the political refugee. However, there is much room
for improvement.
In the case of the political offense exception found in extradi-
tion treaties, some courts, in their zeal to protect a person who
claims to be a political fugitive, have extended protection to those
in power who may be guilty of war crimes. This goes beyond the
original purpose of the political exception, which was to protect
the individual seeking changes in a political system from the
extreme punishment that the requesting State was certain to
invoke upon his return. Using this standard, the political offense
exception should not be available to one in power at the time of
the commission of an offense, since clearly the act charged was
not to obtain a change in a political system, but to preserve the
status quo. Subsequent changes in government should not alter
the result, since the facts as of the time of the commission of the
act are controlling. Such a limitation in application would pre-
serve the political offense exception for those who truly need it,
while denying it to those who seek to use it as a shield for the
commission of abhorrent crimes.
The immigration laws, though usually applied reasonably,
are sometimes used to deport or prevent entrance of a person who
139. Id. at 844.
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is nonextraditable, either because there is no extradition treaty
or because the alleged crime is not covered by the treaty. This
surreptitious use of the immigration laws makes a mockery of
traditional United States practice. It is hoped that the judiciary
will begin to see through this diaphanous attempt to circumvent
the protections accorded a political offender by the extradition
laws through the use of deportation.
Jay A. Bondell
